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Woodrow Wilson, Public Opinion, and
the Punitive Expedition:
ARe-Assessment
LINDA B. HALL and DON M. COERVER

Woodrow Wilson's policy toward Mexico has long been a matter of
controversy. In particular, it has puzzled scholars that he would pursue
a relatively bellicose policy toward Mexico while searching for peace in
Europe. Patrick Devlin has stated that Woodrow Wilson believed that
" ... the essence of political leadership lay in the power to mobilize public
opinion." He goes on to say that "For him the whole art of politics was
the art of presenting an issue to the public clearly and forcefully and so
that they could understand it aright. He excelled in that art .... '" However, in 1916, a number of events converged around the time of Pancho
Villa's Columbus Raid that made it necessary for Wilson to focus more
closely on public opinion and to take actions that he might not have
taken under other circumstances.
It is the authors'· contention that Wilson's dealings with Mexico
were intimately linked with his concerns in Europe, that his actions at
the time that the Pershing Punitive Expedition was sent into Mexico
were closely connected with his fight for military preparedness, and that
both his thoughts and his actions were heavily influenced by his impending re-election battle. He thus neeeded to maintain both a reasonable relationship with the Congress and the respect of the electorate.
Wilson was forced to determine his Mexican policy with a close eye on
public opinion. Further, he used that policy to help influence United
States' public opinion in ways that would help him successfully negoti-
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ate the tightrope between advocates and opponents of United States
entrance into the war in Europe. On his re-election campaign hung his
dreams of being the leader who would bring peace to Europe. He also
needed a sufficient United States military establishment to give him credibility on the world stage, though during early 1916 his military preparedness program was in trouble.
Wilson was not particularly interested at this time (or at any other)
in public opinion spontaneously generated by events. In the 1890s, he
indicated in a lecture on democracy that he "valued public opinion not
because it was the 'average judgement' or an 'unstudied or instinctive
opinion' but because it was the 'opinion of a people, not self-directed,
but directed by its boldest, most prevalent minds. "'2 In fact, he conflated
"public opinion" with his own opinions, seeking out the former largely
to obtain endorsements for his policies. 3 Therefore, if we see his reactions to public opinion as arising spontaneously, we will n()t get very
far. On the other hand, a major key to his leadership is the degree to
which he perceived public opinion in this way.
An important question regarding Wilson's policy toward Mexico, is
the following: why did Wilson, who by all accounts was greatly disturbed by the results of United States actions in Veracruz in April 1914,
and within four months was eager to withdraw American forces, become
involved again by sending the Punitive Expedition after Pancho Villa in
March 1916? The answer that seems most plausible is that Wilson, frustrated over his inability to influence the course of events in Europe and
particularly over his unsuccessful attempts to pressure Germany into an
acceptable agreement on submarine warfare, badly needed a United States
commitment to military preparedness and particularly to a stronger army
if he were to be able to use the threat of United States power to promote
changes in European behavior and to encourage a peace conference.
Certainly he was also concerned that the United States might be required to intervene in Europe and was aware that the military available
to him was woefully inadequate. Indeed, by his own estimate, it was
inadequate for a real war with Mexico. However, limited action in Mexico
would jog the sensibilities of Congress and of the American public to
the dangers of military weakness, provide a spur to the legislation that
he wanted, perhaps clear the border area of bandits, and thus relieve
pressure from anxious politicians and border residents in the southwestern states. Limited action in Mexico might also provide a training
ground for United States forces that might shortly be needed in Europe.
If, as we believe, these were Wilson's intentions, he largely achieved his
objectives, and the decision to send in the Punitive Expedition seems
considerably less quixotic than an expedition into hostile territory for
the sole purpose of capturing Pancho Villa would have been. If intervention in Mexico in response to border incursions (and there had been

LINDA B. HALL AND DON M. COERVER

173

many) had earlier not fit in with his other foreign and domestic objectives, it now did. Although the nature of the American military effort in
Mexico made it extremely unlikely that Villa would in fact be apprehended,
intervention in Mexico was used with considerable effect in those other
areas. Moreover, Wilson's decision to undertake a major campaign to
sell his military preparedness program to the American people seems to
have been closely linked with his decision to go into Mexico. Given the
goals listed above, the Punitive Expedition can be seen as more successful than not, and Wilson as considerably more tough-minded, given
a very difficult situation, than he has heretofore been given credit for.
On the other hand, it seems quite excessive to maintain, as Arthur
Link does, that the Mexican case can be taken as an example of Wilson's
"strengthening of the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes and ~he avoidance of war if conceivably possible." Link
goes on to claim that Wilson twice "personally prevented seemingly
irresistible events from plunging the United States into war with Mexico."4
Surely Wilson had intervened violently in Mexican affairs, both at the
time of the Veracruz occupation and the Punitive Expedition, and any
"irresistible events" were largely of his own making. It seems even less
defensible to claim that "almost singlehandedly, Wilson directly attacked
and destroyed the imperialistic system in Mexico, where it had reached
its apex." Alth'ough Wilson resisted the more egregious attempts of
United States businessmen to force intervention in Mexico, his policies
by no means ended United States' efforts to force the Mexican government to give United States investors special status. These measures,
combined with overt military actions in Mexico, made it more rather than
less, difficult for "Mexicans to move forward in their own way toward
self-government and freedom from outside control."5 Thus we will argue that while Wilson's policies were misguided and counterproductive
from the point of view of United States-Mexican relations and internal
Mexican politics, they can be seen as relatively successful in terms of
United States domestic and international politics.
Wilson had been much distressed by his first sally into the Mexican
arena-the invasion and occupation of Veracruz by United States forces
in April 1914. He was greatly upset by the loss of life, and he began to
see himself as the Mexicans saw him-as the worst kind of imperialist. In
the almost two years that separated the occupation of Veracruz and the
Pershing Expedition, Wilson repeatedly echewed those voices demanding intervention, and insisted that the Mexican people be left alone to
play out their own destiny. Certainly he had been startled at the-fierce
reaction of the Mexican Constitutionalists who were combatting
Victoriano Huerta and whom his efforts had been designed to aid. He
was heretofore more aware of the dangers of dabbling in the internal
affairs of revolutionary countries. 6
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Revolutionaries pose on the steps of the customs house in Ciudad Juarez, 10 May
1911. Photograph courtesy of El Paso Public Library, EI Paso, Texas.
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Pancho Villa, shown with associates Toribio Ortega and Colonel Medina. Photograph courtesy of EI Paso Public Library, EI Paso, Texas.

176

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

APRIL 1997

Still, as the occupying forces pulled out of Veracruz in November
1914, Wilson could tell members ofthe press-off the record-that his
purpose in sending the expedition had been the removal of Victoriano
Huerta from the presidency, and that that goal had been accomplished.
He revealed his feelings about the Mexican president, stating that Huerta
was not representative of the Mexican people but was "nothing but a
'plug ugly,' working for himself. 7 Perhaps, then, Wilson did feel that his
policies had been successful. He must have known, however, that he
would continue to have problems with Mexico, as factional fighting had
already broken out between contending Constitutional forces.
Although Wilson initially was intrigued with Pancho Villa, seeing
him as a kind of social reformer or Robin Hood, he ultimately was forced
to recognize Venustiano Carranza and his Constitutionalists. As early as
August 1915, he tried to overcome his personal distaste for the Mexican
first chief and admitted that any solution that did not take Carranza into
consideration would ignore "some very big facts." Wilson went on to
say that "Carranza will somehow have to be digested into the scheme
and, above all, the object of the revolution will have to be in any event
conserved."8 He recognized that Carranza's commitment to change might
not be sincere, but as a practical matter he acquiesced in Carranza's
assumption of power. Meanwhile, Germany was stirring up trouble between the United States and Mexico in the hope of keeping the United
States out of the European war. As Secretary of State Robert Lansing
put it in a famous passage from his diary, the United States must not
intervene and must recognize one faction and preserve good relations
with it. He stated, "It comes down to this: Our possible relations with
Germany must be our first consideration; and all our intercourse must be
regulated accordingly."9 The United States extended de facto recognition on 19 October. Carranza was said to have exhibited "satisfaction."lo
Wilson's problems in Mexico would nevertheless continue. Villa was
predictably affronted and surprised, despite the fact that his forces had
become increasingly anti-American as their fortunes waned. Alan Knight
called this period, "freelance Villismo," as' coordinated Villista action
became less and less possible through 1915 and Villa's forces broke into
various groups carrying out guerrilla attacks throughout the North.
Knight argues that Villa's anti-Americanism stemmed from one cause:
he had begun to lose. He further suggests that these developments antedated United States' support for Carranza, as the Villista newspaper El
Combate had published anti-gringo articles as early as May 1915. Villa
was further angered by the United States attempt to get Mexican factions to unify behind some lesser and less controversial leader than he
or Carranza. Again, as Knight has noted, "it represented a clumsy intervention in Mexican affairs just when those affairs were achieving some
internal c1ari fication." II
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In any case, recognizing Carranza was bound to anger Villa, and to
the degree that he was able, it was inevitable that he would retaliate.
Long accustomed to movement close to the border, Villa was more familiar with the northern terrain than most of Carranza's troops. While his
ability to fight regular battles had been virtually destroyed by the end of
December 1915, he was still able to cause a great deal of trouble on both
sides of the international boundary. Certainly Germany was interested in
encouraging Villa to cause as much trouble as possible, but a German
connection was by no means necessary to understand his motives. He
was angry at the United States and wished to retaliate; he was aware
that he might well regain some of his status as a hero by striking a blow
to the north; he could embarrass his erstwhile friend Wilson; and he
might be able to draw the Americans into Mexico after him. Such actions
would cause difficulties for the Carranza regime if it either cooperated or
did not resist too strongly. It would also give Villa the 'opportunity to
make United States troops look foolish in territory that he knew very
well. He succeeded in all these aims when he raided Columbus, New
Mexico, on 9 March 1916, prompting Wilson to send in the Punitive
Expedition a few days later. Villa then eluded both United States and
Carranzista troops for months in what must have been a very psychologically satisfying revenge. Indeed, he brought the United States and
the Carranza government to the brink of war.
On the United States side of the border, there were many who were
not reconciled to Carranza's rule in Mexico nor to Wilson's actions in
aiding Carranza. The British government extended de facto recognition
as well, already recognizing to some degree United States hegemony
over Mexico, which would become much stronger after the end of World
War I. British oilmen, however, and their United States counterparts
remained unreconciled. 12 Relations deteriorated as Carranza slowly drew
closer to Germany in 1916. 13 Catholic groups in the United States were
also hostile to Carranza, a hostility that might have cost Wilson in the
1916 presidential election. 14 United States political figures, particularly
those with interests south of the border, quickly became restive. Wilson
had strongly defended his Mexican policy in December 1915 when he
delivered the State of the Union speech to Congress. In a meeting with
the Democratic National Committee he stated that "a people had a right
to do anything with their government that they damned pleased to do,"
and that "if you let the benevolent gentlemen in the United States who
have money invested down there, tell them what kind of government
they should have, it isn't going to stay put, and it ought not to stay
put." He went on to say that he had learned about Mexico from hearing
"liars talk about it," presumably those "gentlemen ... who have money
invested."15 It may be that these gentlemen began to influence their
congressional representatives, particularly on the Republican side, and
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some members of Congress had Mexican investments themselves. Thus,
when Senator Albert Fall of New Mexico introduced a resolution, passed
on 6 January 1916, asking the Wilson administration whether or not there
actually was a government in Mexico and what it was doing to protect
foreign lives and property, Wilson was concerned. The resolution also
specifically addressed the problem of the safety of the United StatesMexico border, so soon to be shown at risk. 16
At the same time, two other major problems occupied Wilson. It is
our contention that these problems were critical to the statements that
he made and to the actions that he took in regard to Mexico through
1916. Furthermore, we contend that he connected these problems with
the Mexican situation. The first problem, related to world affairs, involved Wilson's evolving thinking on the questions of preparedness
and his ability to influence the course of events in Europe. The second,
which would become stronger in both his thinking and his actions through
the first few months of 1916, was the question of his re-election to
office. Both of these matters were complicated by his need to balance
the peace forces, many of them Democrats, who became increasingly
vocal, and the forces pushing for war, in Mexico or in Europe. The latter,
of course, were largely Republicans. In the balance lay not only his reelection but his ability to continue to influence events on the world
stage. Without propelling the country into an actual war, he needed to
look to the electorate, like a man in control of events and capable of
strong action. At the same time, he had to deal with Congress. To convey that image, he would soon be willing to engage in a limited military
action against a small country, while he was still unwilling to plunge an
unprepared nation into either a full-scale war with Mexico or one in
Europe.
The preparedness issue had been developing for several months,
triggered by the sinking of the Lusitania on 7 May 1915. Wilson's diplomacy had foundered from the beginning, as he tried to bluff his way into
an agreement in which Germany would both apologize and pay reparations for the American lives lost. William Jennings Bryan, his peaceminded secretary of state, quickly resigned over the issue, frustrated
and unable to persuade the president to back off from a course that he
feared would lead to war. The Lusitania incident shocked Wilson deeply,
as it had the country at large, and Wilson would be engaged for much of
the time between the sinking and the entrance of the United States into
the war twenty-three months later in an effort to "get Germany to abandon pr moderate submarine warfare against the non-combatant ship."l?
But only three days later, he addressed a gathering of new citizens in
Philadelphia stating that "There is such thing as a man being too proud
to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not
need to convince others by force that it is right."18 Although at least
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one historian contends that Wilson meant these words only as an abstraction-not as a reaction to the Lusitania-it seems unlikely that he
was not affected and reacting at some level. 19 Wilson indeed meant to
discourage actions such as the submarine attack and lost considerable
credibility with those who felt, like Bryan, that "England has been using
our citizens to protect her ammunition," and those who felt that the
United States should immediately take forceful action of some kind. 20
In fact, Wilson considerably damaged his ability to get any kind of
satisfaction from Germany through his statement. He therefore needed
to rebuild the belief in Europe that the United States might in fact be
willing to use force, and to achieve this end he had to show his willingness by word and deed. He also had to have a military threat to use, and
this element he lacked. Though the American navy was a considerable
force, the army was almost non-existent and certainly not truly combatready. Thus, he soon turned his mind to preparedness, and in July 1915,
he directed the secretaries of navy and war to begin planning for a more
adequate national defense. In October, Wilson approved a plan for significant new naval spending; in November the secretary of war's plan
for the expansion of the regular army and the creation of a reserve force
was published, and in his state of the union message in December 1915,
the same one in which he strongly defended his Mexican policy, he
called for these measures to be enacted. Stating that "We regard war
merely as a means of asserting the rights of a people against aggression," he called for passage of the plans of the war and navy departments, which would make possible the development of "disciplined
might." Emphasizing the need for training in "modern fighting," he
plainly drew the connection between preparedness and world influence.
According to Wilson, Americans "must be fitted to play the great role in
the world, and particularly in this hemisphere, for which they are qualified by principle and by chastened ambition to play." Of course, to the
observer, it seems that it would be Wilson himself who actually yearned
to play out this "great role." The importance of the matter loomed so
large to Wilson that virtuaiIy the entire speech was taken up with this
theme, described by him as "the thorough preparation of the nation to
care for its own security and to make sure of entire [sic] freedom to play
the impartial role in this hemisphere and in the world which we all believe to have been providentially assigned to it." And despite his disclaimer that he had in mind "no thought of immediate or particular danger
arising out of our relations with other nations," Mexico as well as other
arenas on the globe were clearly included. 21 Still, many of Wilson's own
supporters remained steadfastly opposed to increasing the size and power
of the military, and they were unconvinced that the arms were exclusively for defense. As Patrick Devlin has put it, "defence [sic] against
whom? Who was threatening? Where was the invader?"22
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Thus, as New Mexico Senator Albert B. Fall and the Senate called
for more information on Mexico in January 1916, the questions of preparedness and world influence were clearly on Wilson's mind. Indeed, it
is not too much to say that apart from more personal matters-he had
just remarried-they dominated his thinking. It was into this context
that the news of the killing of sixteen American mining employees near
the railroad station of Santa Ysabel in Chihuahua, Mexico, would fall.
Pancho Villa's forces, formerly favored but now marginalized by Wilson's
policy, were implicated in this incident. The President made an immediate connection between the security of the United States border and the
preparedness question. Although at that moment he was not eager to
take military action in Mexico, he was willing to use the incident to emphasize the need for an adequate military establishment. At the same
time, the killings brought his Mexican policy under increasing attack
from members of the Senate, particularly the Foreign Relations Committee, with whom he already had plenty of difficulties stemming from the
European war.
Wilson was by no means the first to draw the connection between
Mexico and preparedness. In February 1915, before the sinking of the
Lusitania and Wilson's change of heart in regard to beefing up the armed
services, Senator Fall quite explicitly discussed this link in his speech
on the Army Appropriations Bill. Indeed, its reprinted title read in large
type, "Army Appropriation Bill-Affairs in Mexico." Fall had extensive
connections with United States businessmen active along the border
and deeper into Mexico, inCluding especially oil interests in the Gulf
Coast. Fall had investments in Mexico, as well. He argued that Congress
had failed to provide an adequate army and navy, "adequate" in the
ability "to make [the country] respected, and to protect its citizens wherever they may be legally, whether within the boundaries of our own
country or elsewhere. 23 He also suggested that foreign powers "now
engaged in this great war" might use Mexico as a staging ground for an
invasion of the United States. 24 He took the same opportunity to attack
Wilson's opposition to Huerta and the occupation of Veracruz, which he
maintained (quite correctly, if Wilson himself is to be believed) was intended to overthrow the Mexican dictator rather' than to defend the honor
of the American flag. 25 Fall also called for the establishment of a "police
force" apparently to be drawn from the United States, Argentina, Brazil,
and Chile, to enforce the peace in Mexico, and suggested that "the sooner
we start on it the better for civilization." Then he returned to the question of the size of the army in relation to the Mexican problem, concluding that "this country needs an adequate Army; it needs a nucleus around
which it can gather enough men ... to restore peace and order there."26
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7th Cavalry detachment on the trail of Pancho Villa, 1916. Photograph courtesy of the Arizona Historical Society"
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Therefore, with the killing of Americans at Santa Ysabel in December 1915, it is not surprising that many in the Senate responded with
outrage, not least among them Senator Fall. Four days before, he had
asked the administration to answer a number of questions about its
Mexican policy. The administration had not yet responded. Senator
William J. Stone, Democrat from Missouri and Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was hard pressed to prevent Republicans on
the committee, led by Senator William Borah of Idaho, from bringing a
resolution to the Senate floor that would have forced a vote on intervention in Mexico. 27 Stone called on Lansing and the president to provide
Congress with as much information on Mexico as possible, given that
"facts had been suppressed" and that the availability of such a report
would lessen the widespread suspicion that had arisen. As long as the
administration failed to answer the request for more information made
on 6 January 1916, the confirmation of new Ambassador to Mexico Henry
Fletcher would be held up. Even Democratic Senators friendly to the
President were beginning to wonder whether Wilson's policy of nonintervention could be carried out more actively.28
While the attack at Santa Ysabel caused public opinion Senate problems for Wilson, it afforded him an opportunity as well. He seems at this
precise time, pinpointed by Arthur Link as 18 January, to have made a
decision to take his appeal on preparedness directly to the country.29 On
the previous day, his Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison (soon to
leave the cabinet) and Major General Leonard Wood, addressed a dinner
of more than one thousand bankers in New York, calling for the establishment of a Continental Army and declaring that, as the headlines
proclaimed, "Defense Program Based on the Militia is a Sham."JO Two
days prior, Republican ex:-:-Senator Elihu Root had resoundingly told the
New York State Bar Association that "this country should be equipped
to meet by force of arms all external aggression." The New York Times
lauded the messge as "stirring," stating that it appealed to "the minds
and hearts of all loyal American citizens."JI Circumstances moved many
different groups in the direction of greater military preparedness, though
opposition remained strong. Wilson took advantage of the climate of
public opinion engendered by the murders in Mexico, and began a campaign for arming the nation to which he was personally and visibly committed.
Beginning his tour on 27 January with several speeches in New York,
Wilson emphasized that he would continue to work for peace. Meanwhile, he insisted that Americans "love ... the principles upon which
their political life is founded:' and that this love was stronger than their
love for peace. While he was talking about Americans, it is clear that he
was largely talking about himself, articulating his own principles and
intentions and identifying them with those of the American people. This
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is even clearer in his assertion that "They will at no time seek a contest,
but they will at no time cravenly avoid it."32 Wilson tried hard to persuade Americans and Europeans that he was willing to act, given necessity; that he would not fail the nation through cowardice; and that there
was a point beyond which Europeans and Mexicans could not with impunity violate United States' rights. On the other hand, he was asking
the public and Congress to give him the means to make war while trying
to persuade them that he would not pursue those means. It was a difficult case to make.
He also tried to calm public passions on the Mexico situation and
maintain his own flexibility. He was obviously still very reluctant to intervene. As he presented it to his audience, intervention in Mexico would
have as a consequence the United States' loss of its moral leadership in
Latin America. Rather extraordinarily, he suggested that United States'
loss of influence would devolve upon Europe, which had very little claim
to moral leadership at that moment, given their involvement in an ugly
war. In any case, he emphasized that the United States need not fear an
invasion from the south, but rather must be concerned about its position in the western hemisphere in general. Therefore, military action
against Mexico was still precluded. 33 The same evening, at a speech to
the Motion Picture Board of Trade, he discussed, in the context of the
revelatory nature of the camera, the way in which he had discerned the
lies that those who had come to see him on the Mexican situation told
him. 34 He was still strongly resisting pressure from business groups to
take action to preserve their interests.
As the tour on preparedness progressed, however, he became more
emphatic on the dangers of the Mexican problem. In Chicago on 31 January, he illustrated the need for an adequate peacetime army by discussing the inability of the current force to control the Mexican border. In
this regard, he concluded that "We have not men enough in the United
States Army for the routine work ofpeace."35 On 2 February, in Kansas
City, he went even further. He queried his audience, "But, on land, what
stands behind the President, if he should have to act in your behalf to
enforce the demands of the United States for respect and right? An army
so small that I have not had men enough to patrol the Mexican border."
It was "very mortifying."36 He added that he did not have a force sufficient to prevent bandits from raiding across the boundary into the United
States. Indeed, Wilson was no doubt concerned with his inability to
influence satisfactorily events in Mexico, but he was obviously much
more frustrated with his inability to influence events in Europe. Wilson
let Mexico stand as a surrogate for his lack of power in the European
situation. It was not his failure to protect a few lives in Mexico that was
"mortifying," but rather his failure to achieve his aims in Europe.
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Wilson was immediately concerned with submarine warfare. As mentioned above, he and Lansing had been unable to come to terms with
Germany over the sinking of the Lusitania. At the time of the preparedness speeches, the only issue remaining, as the Germans had agreed at
last on an indemnity, was Wilson's desire ofa German acknowledgment
of the illegality of the action. However, spurred by a communication
from presidential adviser Edward M. House, who was travelling through
Europe holding extensive discussions with the contending powers, he
became more eager to reach an agreement. House communicated with
him in two telegrams sent on 30 January and 2 February, shortly after
House left Berlin. He warned in the first that "A great controversy is
going on in Germany regarding undersea warfare." He reported that although the civil government was resisting, the navy, backed to some
degree by the army, was urging the indiscriminate use of submarines to
break the British blockade. The German military apparently believed that
the blockade was hurting them more than the possible entry of the United
States into the war, an evaluation which must certainly have pricked
Wilson's sense of pride and potency. By the time of the Kansas City
speech, in which he described the humiliation of the Mexican situation,
he would have had House's first telegram and must certainly have been
considerably concerned about the German assessment of the American
threat. The second telegram was even more pessimistic. House doubted
that the potential German crisis could be postponed for much longer,
and he predicted that Germany would soon begin efforts to break the
British blockade with submarine warfare. 3? Wilson, wanting no doubt to
prevent such an outcome, sent House's telegrams to Lansing on 4 February with a note asking whether or not the Lusitania matter might be
settled quickly with a "handsome apology" from Germany which would
dodge the illegality issue. By 16 February, the German ambassador had
submitted a draft that Lansing and Wilson found acceptable, but by that
time the whole question of submarine warfare had changed form once
again. On 10 February, Germany announced her intention to treat armed
merchantmen as warships. At this point, the Lusitania disappeared as
an issue and did not resurface until the post-war settlement; it became
lost in what would become the armed ships imbroglio."38
This latter controversy influenced the relationship between Wilson
and Congress. On 17 February, Representative Jeff McLemore, reflecting the concerns of the public and of Congress, introduced a resolution
requesting that the President caution American citizens against travel
on armed merchant ships. Although such a warning would have seemed
sensible, Wilson feared that it would limit his options and interfere with
his own negotiations with belligerents. In any case, he reacted strongly,
telling a congressional delegation that visited him on 21 February that
the United States government would vigorously defend the right of
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Americans to travel on defensively armed merchant vessels. Senator
Stone, the leader of the delegation, reacted with alarm. Emphasizing that
neither he nor the American people wanted war over such an issue, he
believed the warning entirely appropriate. Otherwise, war might ensue,
and he felt he must follow his own conscience on the Resolution's possible adoption. 39 Three days later Stone wrote the President, indicating
that many members of Congress had discussed the problem with him
and that the President's attitude led some to believe that the armed ships
issue was connected with his preparedness campaign. Implicit was the
notion that the President might indeed be contemplating entrance into
the European war. Certainly he was warning that the President's position would negatively influence congressional attitudes toward that campaign. Although Wilson's timely publication of Stone's letter and his
own reply, which emphasized his efforts to keep the country out of war,
helped diffuse support for the Resolution. It was a close call. The final
count was taken only on 3 March in the Senate and 7 March in the
House. 4o Though Congress defeated McLemore's resolution decisively,
Wilson was again made aware of the exceedingly narrow path he was
treading, and of the difficulties that maintaining a credible military establishment and concurrently avoiding war could cause in terms of his
congressional and public support.
Two days after the defeat of the McLemore resolution in the House,
Pancho Villa raided the town of Columbus, New Mexico, killing at least
seventeen Americans. If Villa's attack was not the invasion across the
United States' southern border that Wilson claimed Americans did not
have to fear, it was nevertheless a reminder of the inability of United
States forces to control even its own frontier. Colonel Herbert Slocum
immediately retaliated despite standing orders that prohibited sending
American troops across the border without Washington's approval.
Slocum sent a pursuing force, under the command of Major Frank
Tompkins, that followed only twenty minutes behind the fleeing Villistas.
Tompkins continued across the international boundary, killing seventyfive to one hundred of the opponents before returning to Columbus
seven-and-a-half hours later. This engagement was by far the largest
and most successful United States' effort against Villa. Tompkins described the major importance of this battle as psychological: " ... most
of all, we took the fight to the Mexicans. "41 Within the day, General John
1. Pershing EI Paso had inquired of the Mexican consul in EI Paso whether
or not the Carranza government would accept United States' help in
capturing Villa. The consul was nervously noncommittal. 42
Thus Wilson was faced with a direct challenge from a figure who'
had been defeated and was, at that time, largely discredited in his own
country. Residents of the border, who had been alarmed by many border
incursions and general unrest in the area since the beginning of the
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decade, again demanded action. Some members of Congress had been
pressing for action to pacify Mexico since the Santa Ysabel massacre a
few weeks earlier. Germany, seemingly unconcerned about United States
sensibilities and Wilson's own determination, had changed the nature
of their submarine war in ways which largely obviated the hope for a
European settlement under United States auspices and further threatened the lives of United States citizens. Wilson, by acting rapidly against
Villa, a weak foe, in a country terribly damaged by six years of civil war,
could focus the attention of the United States on the need for military
preparedness. He could also deflect charges about his own resolve in
dealing internationally to protect American lives, and hopefully make
the border safer for the time being. He could use action against Mexico,
with relatively little risk, as a substitute for action against Germany.
Wilson determined immediately to send in a force to pursue Villa.
This is not to say that the decision did not cause him considerable
agony, and it is clear that from the beginning, Wilson envisioned an
action that would be strictly limited to the pursuit of the man he now
considered a bandit. As he to ld his cabinet, "An adequate force will be
sent at once in pursuit of Villa with the single object of capturing him
and putting a stop to his forays." This wording was preserved for the
press release that followed the 10 March meeting. 43 In this way, he hoped
to gain the benefits of action (regarding public opinion, at least) without
the sacrifices of war. The reference to "adequate" troops, was vague but
reflected Wilson's own preparedness campaign rhetoric urging the adoption of measures that would lead to an adequate peacetime force.
On 15 March, six days after the raid, "an adequate force" of 5,000
men under General Pershing crossed the border. This number seems excessive for what Secretary of War Newton D. Baker had earlier described
to his chief of staff as "a sufficient body of mobile troops to locate and
disperse or capture the band or bands that attacked Columbus."44 Obviously, the President and the army were taking no chances on the possibilities of any humiliation at the hands of Villa's forces, and they were
surely aware that they might expect an attack from the de facto
government's toops as well. Still, the original force was focused on the
cavalry unit appropriate for pursuit of Villa, although later artillery and
infantry units more suitable for other duties were added. 45
Wilson's commitment to a limited action never wavered. Although
the War College argued strongly in a memorandum on the Mexican situation only five days before the Columbus Raid that a restricted action in
Mexico would "invite local disasters and delays," Wilson maintained his
direct control over the operation and kept it carefully defined. The War
College then refused to advise the expedition, so unwise did they think
anything less than a full-force attack. 46 On 22 June, United States troops
became involved in a battle with Carranzista troops that many thought
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would lead to outright war. Both Wilson and the Mexicans retreated, a
circumstance disappointing to Pershing and to his command. As the
General wrote to a friend, Carrizal was the time when "red-blooded Americans felt that we should go in, but we did not advance." He rather bleakly
concluded that "Soldiers are to obey no matter what they think but we
can't keep from thinking. "47 After Carrizal, the United States Army pulled
back into northern Mexico where they waited until recalled in January
and February ofthe following year.
The Expedition did,give the army an' opportunity to get ready for
Europe, however. Whether or not this outcome was intended is a matter
of speculation, but the army was able to make advances in a number of
areas that were important to its later efforts in World War 1. The army
made many advances in motor truck design, standardization, maintenance, and unit organization and used the motor truck for the first time
on a large scale. Airplanes were used operationally. Improvements were
made in health care and disease control, and United States railroads
were organized in more systematic ways for the transportation of men
and equipment. Opportunities were taken for courses in tactics and musketry, and "practical exercises."48 As Pershing noted in his autobiography, "when the command left Mexico it was probably more highly trained
than any similar force of our army had ever been before. "49
I
An additional benefit for Wilson was his opportunity to call the
National Guard into action. Formerly uncertain as to what his legal control over the Guard units might be, Wilson succesfully mobilized 112,000
of an estimated 130,000 guardsmen available by the end of July 1916. 50
Although the role of the Guard during the Punitive Expedition was limited to protecting the border on the United States side, this call up nevertheless had many benefits. General Hugh Scott, Wilson's chief of staff,
credited it with discouraging the Mexicans from potential invasion plans,
although it seems unlikely that the Mexicans ever really intended an
invasion except in extraordinary circumstances,51 National Guardsmen
had the opportunity for training, a major concern of Scott's, and were
able to develop a sense of unity and esprit de corps that helped them
later in Europe. The army closed many of its own service schools and
sent instructors to the border to take part in this training. Along the
border, the Army experienced chronic shortages of equipment and a lack
or organization. Although these difficulties were not fully resolved at
the time the Guard was sent to Europe, steps had been taken toward
improvement. The National Guard contained largely infantry units, and
the need for supplementation with artillery, engineer, cavalry, and support troops was recognized and dealt with. The Guard improved considerably in the months of the Punitive Expedition; it put together a
seventeen-division force that was sent to Europe. 52
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United States armored tanks stationed on the border, 1916. Photograph courtesy of the Arizona Historical Society.

Tractor pulling hay for the cavalry horses during the campaign against villa,
1916. Photograph courtesy of the Arizona Historical Society.
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Squadron of military airplanes being used in the campaign against Pancho Villa on the Mexican border, 1916. Photograph courtesy of the Arizona Historical Society.
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Although the Punitive Expedition exhibited many advantages for
Wilson, some of them perhaps not envisioned at the time it was sent into
Mexico, he hesitated at the last minute. Hearing that Carranzista troops
threatened to retaliate with force, he temporarily delayed the United
States border crossing. However, two of his closest associates-House
and Joseph Tumulty-stressed emphatically the importance of projecting an image of strength and resolve. Distraught, Tumulty sent him a
strong note in which he indicated that "To retrace our steps now could
be not only disastrous to our party and humiliating to the country, but
would be destructive of our influence in international affairs and make it
forever impossible to deal in any effective way with Mexican affairs."53
House also believed that a failure to act would greatly damage Wilson's
political position at home and his influence in Europe, and he drew the
connection between Mexico and Germany quite explicitly when he speculated that Wilson was determined "not to allow Germany to force him
into intervention." House reported that Tumulty "argued with the President desperately, saying that if he did not send our troops after Villa, or
if he hesitated a moment to act, he might just as well not contemplate
running for the Presidency, since he would not get a single electoral
vote." House further indicated that reports that the Carranzista army
would attack United States troops if they entered Mexican territory had
been in error, and that Wilson could therefore proceed. 54 In the event,
Mexican troops fell back to avoid problems with the United States units
as they crossed the border, but it is instructive that Wilson shrank from
any circumstance that would have involved the United States in a fullscale war.
Although it was not to be expected that this restricted action in
Mexico would exempt Wilson from further criticism from those who
wanted a more virile American response, it nevertheless illustrated that
Wilson was ready to use at least some degree of force to protect United
States lives and interests. In addition, Congress finally took action to
increase the armed forces. Bills to this effect were introduced in both
houses of Congress in early March 1916, coincidental with the Columbus raid and the move into Mexico. Wilson signed the National Defense
Act in June. In the same month, the Democratic convention in St. Louis
renominated Wilson for President by an overwhelming vote. A heated
re-election campaign ensued, in which his Mexican policy was a point
at issue. June was also the month of the Carrizal confrontation between
United States forces and Mexican troops. It had led many observers to
expect war, before both Wilson and Carranza backed away. The Democratic platform supported Wilson's moderation, pointing out that although the temporary use of force was sanctioned, intervention in Mexico
was not acceptable to the American people. 55 Republicans kept up the
pressure, with the National Committee even sending a representative to
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EI Paso to report on "murders ... and outrages upon our citizens in
Mexico." Still, despite a setback when Secretary of War Baker compared
Mexican revolutionaries to George Washington's soldiers, Wilson was
able to avoid major problems, either with regard to public opinion or
through further military confrontation, by limiting the mission of the
Expedition and by pulling it back into northern Chihuahua. 56 Although
Wilson did not feel sure enough of himself politically to withdraw the
Expedition completely, he did not want to precipitate any further encounters. He still hoped to gain concessions from the Carranza government, however, and he continued to press for assurances on the
protection of property and a claims commission, until conditions in Europe forced him unilaterally to order withdrawal in January 1917. Throughout the campaign he had to dodge critics on one side who questioned
whether he had actually "kept us out of war," given the presence of U.S.
troops in Mexico, and those who wanted a more strenuous effort there. 57
But Wilson did keep the action limited, and he was re-elected, barely.
The Pershing Punitive Expedition left a considerable residue of illwill in Mexico, and Carranza drew closer and closer to Germany. Ironically, this rapprochement led Germany to propose an alliance with Mexico
in the Zimmermann Telegram in early 1917. The interception of this communication was important in precipitating the United States entrance
into World War I. Pancho Villa was elevated from a defeated and discredited loser to the status of a national hero, having defied the Colossus of
the North and living to tell about it. His increased strength permitted
him to continue to defy and harass the Carranza government the ful1
length of its term. Within the United States, however, the Expedition
achieved some important ends. Wilson was able to spur the nation toward an accelerated program of military preparedness that served him
well when the United States entered the European War in 1917. The
actual use of forces within Mexico and on the border furnished a measure of training and helped to anticipate and solve logistical, supply,
and equipment difficulties. Despite a difficult election and a strong Republican challenge in 1916, Wilson did win re-election, and despite being forced into the war, he was able to playa considerable role in the
peace. Although he was ultimately unable to prevent the German use of
submarine warfare, the action in Mexico may well have helped delay
United States entrance into the war in Europe until the former was better
prepared to fight it. Therefore, within the context of United States domestic politics and diplomatic necessities, Wilson's decision to go into
Mexico can be seen not as a capricious and hasty move but rather as a
careful threading of the way through the minefield of domestic and international problems that confronted him in 1916.
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